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104.244.73.193

As of: Dec 09, 2023 5:48pm UTC | Latest

Basic Information

Reverse DNS
tor-exit.for-privacy.net
Forward DNS
tor-exit.for-privacy.net
Routing
104.244.73.0/24  via PONYNET, US (AS53667)
Services (2)
80/HTTP, 443/UNKNOWN

HTTP 80/TCP
12/09/2023 09:04 UTC


Details

http://104.244.73.193/
Status
200  OK
Body Hash
sha1:6bcae0a527a7f28da6f7185016d7ab9a6e213b02
HTML Title
This is a Tor Exit Router
Response Body
      # This is a Tor Exit Router

Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with the
traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the [Tor Anonymity
Network](https://www.torproject.org/), which is dedicated to [providing
privacy](https://www.torproject.org/about/overview) to people who need it
most: average computer users. This router IP should be generating no other
traffic, unless it has been compromised.

Tor works by running user traffic through a random chain of encrypted servers,
and then letting the traffic exit the Tor network through an exit node like
this one. This design makes it very hard for a service to know which user is
connecting to it, since it can only see the IP-address of the Tor exit node:

[Read more about how Tor works.](https://www.torproject.org/about/overview)

Illustration showing how a user might connect to a service through the Tor
network. The user first sends their data through three daisy-chained encrypted
Tor servers that may exist on different continents. Then the last Tor server
in the chain connects to the target service over the normal internet. The user
This server Your service Tor encrypted link Unencrypted link

Tor sees use by [many important segments of the
population](https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers), including whistle
blowers, journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and
oppressive censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and
law enforcement, just to name a few. While Tor is not designed for malicious
computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends.
In reality however, the actual amount of
[abuse](https://support.torproject.org/abuse/) is quite low. This is largely
because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to privacy and
anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals can and do
[build, sell, and
trade](https://web.archive.org/web/20200131013910/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_tools.html)
far larger and [more powerful
networks](https://web.archive.org/web/20200131013908/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_distributing_your.html)
than Tor on a daily basis. Thus, in the mind of this operator, the social need
for easily accessible censorship-resistant private, anonymous communication
trumps the risk of unskilled bad actors, who are almost always more easily
uncovered by traditional police work than by extensive monitoring and
surveillance anyway.

In terms of applicable law, the best way to understand Tor is to consider it a
network of routers operating as common carriers, much like the Internet
backbone. However, unlike the Internet backbone routers, Tor routers
explicitly do not contain identifiable routing information about the source of
a packet, and no single Tor node can determine both the origin and destination
of a given transmission.

As such, there is little the operator of this router can do to help you track
the connection further. This router maintains no logs of any of the Tor
traffic, so there is little that can be done to trace either legitimate or
illegitimate traffic (or to filter one from the other). Attempts to seize this
router will accomplish nothing.

A Tor relay is a simple data carrier ( _mere conduit_ ) in the terms of
Article 12 of the [european directive 2000/31/CE of 8 June 2000](https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:En:HTML): we do
not initiate the transmissions, we do not select the receiver of the
transmission, and we do not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission. Therefore, we are not liable for the information transmitted.

As a German organization, we fully comply with [Telekommunikation-Telemedien-
Datenschutz-Gesetz §9](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ttdsg/__9.html) (the
German telemedia data protection law), which prohibits to log any personally
identifiable data or usage data unless required for billing purposes. As we do
not charge for using our services, we will never be able to keep any
connection data.

Tor routers owned by German media services are protected by [Telemediengesetz
§8](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/__8.html)

For more information, please consult the following documentation:

  * [Tor Overview](https://www.torproject.org/about/overview)
  * [Tor Abuse FAQ](https://support.torproject.org/abuse/)
  * [Tor Legal FAQ](https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/eff-tor-legal-faq/)

That being said, if you still have a complaint about the router, you may email
the [maintainer](mailto:[email protected]). If complaints are related to a
particular service that is being abused, I will consider removing that service
from my exit policy, which would prevent my router from allowing that traffic
to exit through it. I can only do this on an IP+destination port basis,
however. Common P2P ports are already blocked.

You also have the option of blocking this IP address and others on the Tor
network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a [web
service](https://check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist) to fetch a list of all
IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a specified IP:port
combination, and an official [DNSRBL](https://dist.torproject.org/tordnsel/)
is also available to determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit
server. Please be considerate when using these options. It would be
unfortunate to deny all Tor users access to your site indefinitely simply
because of a few bad apples.

[All ForPrivacyNET Tor
Relays](https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/ForPrivacyNET) are
privately funded out of my own pocket.

In the unlikely event that someone wants to contribute to the monthly network
traffic and server costs so that even more new exit relays can be set up,
donations can be sent to Monero address:

84o3pgWVthGaKgQuBgDC9sVPfygnSkvc7XyLVg8gxnwd41Z7jmBz4xR1xLfutwCfchHoVNw1F58RD8aWHCRTS8fvBsG5MEa  
OpenAlias **donate.for-privacy.net** or **[email protected]** can be used
for simplification and to avoid mistakes. If you want to donate other
cryptocurrencies, just ask.  
I recently happened to see that someone has donated something for the 1st
time. A funny "1337" amount ;-)

This exit is possible because of the privacy-supporting hosting service
[frantech](https://buyvm.net). Special thanks to Francisco and his team.
    

UNKNOWN 443/TCP
12/09/2023 17:48 UTC


Details

TLS

Handshake
Version Selected
TLSv1_3
Cipher Selected
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Certificate
Fingerprint
7e820cf5a55ca11c71c75518346de2593655a19327b9d6d4ac834d443f7b37f7
Subject
CN=www.bzvjukuz.net
Issuer
CN=www.qplvclsajs6c.com
Names
www.bzvjukuz.net
Fingerprint
JA3S
15af977ce25de452b96affa2addb1036

Geographic Location

City
Luxembourg
Province
Luxembourg
Country
Luxembourg (LU)
Coordinates
49.61167, 6.13
Timezone
Europe/Luxembourg